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‘They can’t handle the race agenda’: stakeholders’ reflections on race 
and education policy, 1993-2013 
 
Abstract 
This paper explores the personal reflections of educators and contributors to policy on the 
shifting status of race equality in education policy in England between 1993 and 2013. The 
interview participants included some of the most notable figures active in race equality work 
in England. Part of the paper’s significance is its focus on the perspectives of actors with 
longstanding involvement in the field of race equality, who have witnessed changes in policy 
over time. As ‘stakeholders’ with direct involvement in education policy-making and 
enactment, the participants tended to focus on three historic policy moments. These were:  
measures aimed at closing ethnic achievement gaps that began in the early 1990s; the 
diversity and citizenship agenda that featured in New Labour’s term; the Macpherson Report 
(1999) and the subsequent Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000). Participants’ narratives 
converged in a largely pessimistic view of 1993-2013 as a period in which race equality 
policy had gained momentum, touched the policy mainstream - but then failed. By the end of 
the New Labour administration (1997-2010) and the start of the subsequent Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition government (2010-2015) explicit focus on race equality in 
education policy had, in the views of the participants, been severely diminished. 
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Introduction 
 
I increasingly feel… like a kind of race and ethnicity dinosaur… standing still while 
all these new and sexy topics are kind of rushing around me and getting lots of 
funding. 
        Claire Alexander (2014) 
 
In the past half-century race equality has rocked back and forth between the margins and the 
centre of education policy in England. How do educators with longstanding commitment to 
race equality perceive this ebb and flow? Sociologist Claire Alexander made the self-
deprecating ‘dinosaur’ remark during a recent seminar on the voguish topic of super-diversity 
(Alexander and Arday, 2015) and it is hard not to sympathise with the mood of the dinosaur, 
the race equality veteran confronted by upstart theories and issues. In England race equality 
in education policy has historically been bound up with the wider role of state 
multiculturalism. However, in the 21
st
 Century state multiculturalism is routinely depicted as 
an anachronism. For some commentators, state multiculturalism has been counter-productive, 
encouraging ethnic divisions and white resentment (see, for example, Goodhart 2013; 
Phillips, 2016). Others argue, either more optimistically or more disingenuously, that racism 
has declined in social salience and that multiculturalism in education and other areas of 
public provision is outmoded (Mirza, 2010). Commenting on this turn, Gilroy (2004) has 
argued that the political disavowal of state multiculturalism is rooted in a ‘growing sense that 
it is now illegitimate to believe that multiculture can and should be orchestrated by 
government in the public interest’ (Gilroy, 2004: 1). 
 
Alexander’s ‘dinosaur’ quip hinges on a distinction between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’. 
However, in policy the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ are always discursive products, politically 
determined. Garner (2010) and Warmington (2015) have noted that the depiction of state 
multiculturalism as anachronistic is a distinctive feature in contemporary debates in England. 
For while, on the political right, multiculturalism has long been a folk demon, the emphasis 
on the anachronistic nature of state multiculturalism has provided an umbrella wherein critics 
of multiculturalism across the political spectrum can distance themselves from charges of 
being reactionary or racist, and can instead locate themselves as forward-looking. The 
depiction of state multiculturalism as outmoded allows the possibility that it might once have 
been a necessary evil, but no longer. David Cameron, Conservative prime minister between 
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2010 and 2016, declared of state multiculturalism that ‘it is time to turn the page on the failed 
policies of the past’ (Cameron, 2011). However, Chakrabortty (2010) has suggested that 
claims about the decline of racism are more a rhetorical claim to ‘newness’ and political 
vitality than a factual description of current social relationships.  
 
Significance of the paper 
This paper explores the personal reflections of interviewees - each of whom has longstanding 
involvement in the field of race equality - upon the shifting status of race equality in 
education policy in England over the twenty years between 1993 and 2013. The interview 
participants included some of the most influential figures in race equality work in England 
during that period. Their standpoints were diverse and their analyses of what drove race 
equality policy in education varied. Some emphasised the active role of BME communities 
coupled with governments’ concern with being seen to respond to social discontent; others 
depicted government policy as a rational, evidence-based response (for example, to data on 
achievement gaps). However, the participants’ narratives converged in a largely pessimistic 
view of 1993-2013 as a period in which the race equality in education policy built in 
momentum, touched the policy mainstream - and then failed. By the end of the New Labour 
administration (1997-2010) and the start of the subsequent Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
Coalition government (2010-2015) explicit focus on race equality in education had, in the 
views of participants, been diminished; there was no longer a language in which to address 
race equality, to locate it within governance or within political values.  
 
Part of the significance of this paper is its focus on the perspectives of actors who have 
‘hinterland’, who have witnessed shifts and cycles in race equality policy over time, and who 
have had degrees of direct involvement in policy-making and enactment. The participants 
include educators; community activists; third sector workers and trade unionists. Some have 
held multiple roles: for example, teachers who have also taken on civil service roles; 
academics who have also been involved in producing policy reports or in community 
campaigning. Across the course of their professional lives, such actors may have moved 
between the margins and the centre of the policy world, depending on the wider political 
mood. They are, as it were, ‘old hands’ in the field and practice of race equality.  
 
The value of these stakeholders’ voices may be understood in terms of phronesis. The Greek 
term for practical judgement, wisdom and intelligence has been reclaimed by sociocultural 
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theorists such as Avis (2016) to describe how critical understandings of particular fields and 
practices may derive from the longevity of actors’ practical experience. It refers to the kinds 
of situated knowledge that supports judgements embedded in ‘complexity and indeterminacy 
at the site of practice’ (Avis, 2016: 53). In short, the participants who contributed to this 
paper draw on knowledge that enables them to treat race not merely as a short-term policy 
item but with what Apple (2001: 204) has termed ‘due recognition of its complexity … (as) a 
set of fully social relationships.’  
 
In exploring articulations between race and education, the position of this paper is one of race 
ambivalence (Leonardo, 2005). For while race may be ‘unreal’ in the sense that it is not a 
coherent scientific category, its effects or ‘modes of existence’ (Leonardo, 2005: 409) are 
real. In other words, we live as if race has meaning; we live race in practice, experiencing the 
world in ways that are mediated by racialised social categories and relationships. Race in 
practice has innumerable consequences and while race intersects with other social identities, 
it is not sufficient merely to regard race as technology of other supposedly more ‘real’ 
relationships, such as class. Nor should research on race and education treat race as a social 
identity that simply exists prior to the field of education; racial identities and divisions are 
also produced within educational sites (including policy). It is in this sense that race is a 
social construction, a social relationship. 
 
In certain instances this paper also uses the term ‘ethnicity’. This is usually to reflect policy 
efforts to address achievement gaps between ‘ethnic’ categories. For example, for monitoring 
purposes in Britain the category ‘black’ will typically be disaggregated into ethnic categories 
such as ‘black Caribbean’ or ‘black African’. However, as noted in [Author], ethnicity is no 
less a social construction than race and should be treated critically. Terms such as ‘ethnicity’ 
and ‘culture’ have been used to acknowledge diversity while shifting away from fixed 
‘biological’ notions of race but they have not always circumvented the old problems of the 
race concept, sometimes becoming just as rigid and essentialist. In Britain discourses around 
Muslim communities are an example of how ideas about race, ethnicity, culture and faith are 
co-constituted (see Kundnani, 2007; Malik, 2009). 
 
Methods and methodology 
The material analysed in the current paper derives from interviews conducted during a two-
year research study funded by the Society for Educational Studies. The Race, Racism and 
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Education (RRE) study was conducted between 2013 and 2015 (in the second half of the 
Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government). It focused on education in England 
during the twenty-year span, 1993-2013, and its aims were twofold. Firstly, there was an 
interview-based strand, examining perceptions of the changing status of race equality in 
education policy (which is the focus of the current paper). Secondly, there was a quantitative 
strand, charting attainment and progression among black and minority ethnic students in 
compulsory, post-compulsory and higher education (covered extensively in Gillborn et al, 
forthcoming).  
 
For the interview strand, selection of participants followed a ‘key informant’ model, wherein 
participants were selected because of their involvement in developing, enacting and 
evaluating race equality policy in education during the period 1993 -2013. In order to provide 
diversity, at the point of recruitment participants were nominally categorised as ‘politicians’ 
(for instance, former education ministers), ‘senior policy-makers’ (for instance, civil servants 
with cabinet-level involvement) and ‘stakeholders’. The latter group included practitioners 
involved in educational leadership, community activism, the third sector, academia and trade 
unions. There was overlap between categories of participant: for example, there were trade 
unionists and academics who had been involved in government advisory groups and in 
producing policy reports. The importance of the ‘stakeholder’ group, who feature in the 
current paper, was that their participation ensured the study included practitioners with 
lengthy involvement in race and education, in some cases dating back as far as the 1970s and 
1980s. This distinguished them from participants whose focus on race and education was 
relatively short-term. It also helped us to understand policy not only in terms of top-down 
government but also in terms of enactment at local levels (cf. Ball et al, 2012). Given the 
number of people nationally that might potentially have fit our key informant criteria, the 
‘sample’ was inevitably small in scale but we were confident that it included some of the 
most notable figures active in race equality work during the period, including participants 
with decades of work in the field.  
 
Thirty-five interviews were conducted in the RRE research study. Twenty-two interviewees 
were from BME groups (8 female, 14 male); thirteen were white British (5 female, 8 male). 
The current paper focuses principally on interviews with around twenty participants whom 
we defined at the point of recruitment as ‘stakeholders’. The interviews were semi-structured, 
in-depth and generally lasted between forty minutes and ninety minutes. Organising themes 
7 
 
included interviewees’ perceptions of landmarks in race equality in education and in the 
wider public sphere between 1993 and 2013; their involvement in education policy 
initiatives; their views on persistent inequalities in education; and their understandings of the 
influence of concepts such as cultural diversity and institutional racism on education policy. 
Interviews were fully transcribed and were analysed using a constant comparative method as 
a means identifying recurrent constructs (Thomas, 2009). This thematic analysis enabled 
reconstruction of participants’ analyses of the shifting status of race equality in education 
policy. Given that the interviews concerned views on government and policy, informed 
consent, confidentiality and anonymity were salient issues. All participants were informed 
that the RRE study focused on shifts in the place of race equality in education policy. With 
three exceptions (the interviewees referred to as ‘Jo’, ‘Celia’ and ‘Howard’), the participants 
were willing to permit their real names to be used in reporting the research (.  
 
In terms of methodology, the interviews were used as means to access the meanings that 
participants ascribed to their experiences of changes in race and education policy over time. 
Interviews were not viewed in idealised terms, as offering ‘authentic’ perspectives on policy 
history and contexts but as ‘situated elements in social worlds’ (Silverman, 2004: 4), 
narrative accounts ordered by the interviewees in order to produce representations. In short, 
the interviews were understood as local accomplishments, joint constructions produced by 
interviewer and interviewee (cf. Silverman, 2004). As such, it was necessary to acknowledge 
the forces mediating interviewees’ voices: in particular, the retrospective nature of 
interviewees’ accounts. However, such factors notwithstanding, our analytic standpoint was 
that interviewing provided credible access to the ways in which participants understood their 
social worlds.  
 
Education policy context, 1993-2013 
In exploring participants’ retrospective views of a twenty-year period, the current paper 
comprises a form of oral history – and memory and hindsight play complex roles in historical 
research. The participants were asked to cast their minds back as far as 1993. That year  
is a significant marker in the history of race in England because of the racist murder of 
Stephen Lawrence. The Lawrence family’s subsequent campaign for justice secured a public 
inquiry (Macpherson, 1999) that directly shaped changes in race equality legislation and 
made specific recommendations to address racial inequality in the public sector, including 
education. However, Stephen’s death did not have an immediate impact on government 
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policy, and certainly not on the education sector. The Macpherson Report (into police 
handling of Stephen’s murder) and the subsequent Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 
(hereafter, RRAA 2000) featured significantly in participants’ accounts but it is important not 
to treat those ‘landmarks’ teleologically. Moreover, in their reflections interviewees often 
placed emphasis on what did not happen: what was lacking in terms of addressing race 
equality in education policy. It is important, therefore, to keep a broad sense of what was 
happening, of what government’s educational priorities were and how marginal issues of race 
and racism often were among decision-makers. 
 
The year 1993 was mid-term in John Major’s beleaguered Conservative administration. A 
year earlier the Education (Schools) Act 1992 had established the new schools inspectorate, 
Ofsted. By 1993 capital spending on schools had fallen to less than half of what it had been in 
the mid-1970s and the education sector saw the continuation of market-led reforms (Gillard, 
2011). Education Secretary Chris Patten laid out a commitment to expanding selection in the 
secondary school system, to providing ‘choice’ and ‘diversity’ for parents and to addressing 
falling standards in literacy and numeracy. These principles formed the basis of the Education 
Act (1993) (Benn, 2011).  
 
In 1997 a Labour government was returned to power in the UK for the first time in eighteen 
years. Refashioning the party as ‘New Labour’, Prime Minister Tony Blair famously 
announced the new government’s priority as ‘Education, education, education!’ Summarising 
the scope of New Labour’s education policy in a short space is unfeasible. However, Jones 
(2003) describes the fundamentals of New Labour’s education policy as diversity of 
educational provision combined with a forceful regulatory system that aimed at increasing 
average attainment (see also Ball, 2008; Sammons, 2008). Embedded in a discourse of 
quality, accountability and standards but also with putative concern for social inclusion, New 
Labour’s period of government (1997-2010) included measures such as the initiation of the 
National College for School Leadership, Education Action Zones, the Every Child Matters 
strategy, the academies programme and, in 2005, a five-year strategy that mentioned BME 
pupils just once (Ball, 2008).  
 
The relative absence of race as an issue in the five-year strategy reflects the extent to which, 
by the early 21
st
 Century, issues of race equality and multiculturalism had become ‘toxic’ (in 
the words of interviewee Professor Sally Tomlinson, whose research on race and education 
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dates back to her pioneering work with John Rex in the 1970s). Post-9/11, national and global 
antagonisms influenced education and social policy, and shaped wider debates on race 
equality and cultural diversity. Key events in England included 2001’s disturbances in 
northern English towns (which news media sensationalised as ‘race riots’); the London 
bombings of 7/7/2005; widespread urban rest in the summer of 2011, and increased media 
focus on immigration levels. All of these fed into popular anxieties about multiculturalism, 
‘self-segregation’, radicalisation of young Muslims and perceived ‘urban’ lawlessness. 
Kundnani (2007) argued that the period between the Macpherson Report and 7/7 saw a 
pervasive backlash: 
 
The beginning of the 21
st
 century marked a high point of progress against racism in 
Britain. Since then multicultural Britain has been under attack by government policies 
and vitriolic press campaigns with an intensity unmatched by anything since at least 
the 1970s. 
        (Kundnani, 2007: 180) 
 
 
The Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition government that succeeded Labour in 2010 
saw educational reform largely in terms of reshaping school structures, building on New 
Labour’s concern with parental choice and diversity of provision, through the expansion of 
the academies programme and the introduction of free schools. Although social mobility 
remained a discursive motif (with increasing focus on low achievement among white 
working-class pupils), 2011 saw the abolition of Labour’s Education Maintenance 
Allowance, a scheme designed to encourage 16-19 year olds to stay on in education. As for 
curriculum content, Wrigley (2015) has argued that Education Secretary (2010-2014) 
Michael Gove’s concern with standards, attainment and refocusing on ‘core’ subjects largely 
expunged any focus on cultural diversity (a claim also made by several of the interviewees). 
At an international level it should also be noted that government concerns about standards 
and attainment have grown partly out of anxieties about the UK’s performance against global 
benchmarks (see Baumann and Winzar, 2016).   
 
Mainstreaming race equality 
…if you looked back at the 1960s and 70s and wherever you were then, you would 
say we are further on than then, but we have been further on than we are now… It’s 
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gone up and dipped and gone up and dipped. And I would say at the moment it’s 
dipping.  
     (Sir Tim Brighouse, Senior Education Officer) 
 
How did the stakeholder participants depict changes in the positioning of race equality in 
education policy? What did they identify as the ‘ups’ and the ‘dips’ of the 1993-2013 period? 
In terms of the impact of race equality concerns on education policy, three historic policy 
moments were repeatedly identified, salient moments at which race equality work was 
‘mainstreamed’. 
 
The first of these comprised policy measures explicitly aimed at closing ethnic achievement 
gaps in schools. These began in piecemeal, local fashion in the early 1990s and were 
sustained by later strategies, such as the Ethnic Minority Achievement Grant (1999-2011), 
the London Challenge (2003-2011) and its extension, City Challenge (2008-2011). Secondly, 
there was the diversity and citizenship agenda that featured in New Labour’s final term 
(Ajegbo et al, 2007). This was arguably a late incarnation of the citizenship reviews and 
reports on community cohesion that emerged in response to 9/11 and the urban unrest in 
northern English cities in 2001 (e.g. Ouseley, 2001; Cantle, 2001). Thirdly, interviewees 
referred to the impact of the Macpherson Report (1999), which reclaimed the concept of 
‘institutional racism’, and the statutory duties introduced in the subsequent Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act (2000). 
 
The first thing to note is that the stakeholders – including several who had been involved in 
policy and advisory roles - tended to reject strongly the idea that government policy was 
consistently committed to addressing race equality. Retrospectively, they depicted the period 
2003-2013 in terms of a downward arc of emergence, momentum and retreat: apparent, for 
instance, in the rolling back of Macpherson’s focus on institutional racism. A second thing to 
note is the dissonance in participants’ accounts of what drove race equality policy. Those 
more closely aligned with community activism tended to see government action as a response 
to wider social antagonisms, to community demands and urban unrest. Those who had been 
closely involved in top-down policy, however, sometimes offered more positivistic accounts, 
depicting policy as being evidence-driven and emphasising the role of performance data in 
convincing ministers of the need for action on racial inequalities in education.  
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‘Bottom up’ and ‘top down’ 
Research on race and education in the UK has argued that government action has often been a 
belated response to community campaigning or urban unrest (Grosvenor, 1997; Warmington, 
2014). In the 1970s ILEA’s work on multicultural education was a response to a decade and 
more of campaigning by London’s black communities and by anti-racist teachers. In the 
1980s the Scarman (1981) and Swann (1985) reports responded to major unrest in inner-
cities. In the early 2000s disturbances in the north of England were followed by the Cantle 
Report (2001) and the Ajegbo Report (2007). 
 
Like several other stakeholder participants, veteran human rights activist Maxie Hayles, 
former chair of the Birmingham Racial Attacks Monitoring Unit (BRAMU), set the scene for 
discussion of the 1993-2013 period by making reference to the experiences of the 1980s: 
 
I call them the disturbances of the 80s; I didn’t call it riots …black youngsters were 
saying enough is enough …they took to the streets …and (under) the Tories, the 
education of black people then came more to the fore and policies began to be made 
because they knew they had problems.  
       (Maxie Hayles, human rights activist) 
 
What Hayles points to here is the dynamic that critical race theorists describe as ‘interest 
convergence’ (Bell, 1980). Based on analysis of US civil rights legislation, interest 
convergence suggests that apparently progressive moves in race equality are most likely be 
secured where they secure the interests of white elites as well as accommodating the demands 
of black communities. However, those progressive policies become vulnerable and prone to 
retreat when they cease to converge with elite interests. Gillborn (2014) has noted that the 
notion of interest convergence is frequently misunderstood. It does not ‘envisage a rational 
and balanced negotiation between minoritized groups and white power holders, where change 
is achieved through the mere force of reason and logic. History suggests that advances in 
racial justice must be won through political protest and mobilisation that create a situation 
where - for white interests - taking some action against racism becomes the lesser of two 
evils’ (Gillborn, 2014: 29).  
 
Among some interviewees, particularly those with backgrounds in community activism and 
those from BME backgrounds, there was a tendency to describe race equality policies as 
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examples of government needing to be seen to act in response to campaigning and crisis. For 
example, ‘Celia’ (pseudonym), who described herself as a ‘civil servant’ but had 
longstanding involvement in race equality in schools, commented that calls for government 
action on race equality in the 1990s: 
 
…really reached its crescendo after Stephen Lawrence was killed …governments 
…need to respond to that …they can’t just ignore it …because it was such a major 
event, there was a need to respond to that.  
      ‘Celia’ (civil servant and academic) 
 
Academic and trade union activist, Professor Gargi Bhattacharyya referred to race equality 
policy having been driven by ‘many years of intensive activity and a great deal of quite 
heroic work by ordinary people in ordinary communities.’  Among policy-makers, Peter 
Wanless, author of DfES’ (2006) report on racism and school exclusions, described having 
worked at DfES at a time when it was responsive to community-driven research. School 
exclusions remain a perennial campaigning issue among black Caribbean communities and 
the 2006 report was tellingly titled, Exclusion of Black Pupils: Getting it. Getting it Right:   
 
‘…exclusion rates, for black people, was a really iconic issue ...if you listened to what 
the particular parts of the black community were saying about the education system, 
unless and until an appropriate focus was placed on disproportionate exclusion rates 
…they weren’t necessarily going to seriously believe that the Department was 
engaged and interested…’ 
  Peter Wanless (ex-Department for Education and Skills [DfES]) 
     
However, there was a parallel discourse that emphasised the top-down role of government 
data in driving race equality policy. This narrative did not discount wider political 
imperatives but it emphasised ‘causal’ relationships between official research evidence and 
subsequent policy. One example was Sir Tim Brighouse’s discussion of the influence of pupil 
performance data. In the early 1990s, prior to the Macpherson Report, performance data by 
ethnicity was produced at uneven rates across England. Recalling his work as Chief 
Education Officer in Birmingham (1993-2002), Brighouse described the city as being ahead 
of many other local authorities in generating ethnic performance data, recognising its 
implications and developing strategies aimed specifically at closing ethnic achievement gaps. 
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Brighouse also described initiatives such as the London Challenge (2003-2011), developed 
during his subsequent period as Schools Commissioner for London (2002-07), as being 
supported by a robust statistical base.  
 
Educational consultant Inderjit Dehal, who as a senior civil servant at DfES with a particular 
concern for race equality, led the London Challenge initiative and its regional extension, the 
City Challenge, also argued that the evidence on pupil performance convinced education 
ministers to address ethnic gaps in achievement. Labour’s ‘high performance/ high equity’ 
approach (see, for example, DfES, 2005) aspired to improve general achievement, while 
simultaneously minimising gaps between the highest achieving and ‘underachieving’ groups 
(see critiques by e.g. Archer and Francis, 2007; Ball, 2008). 
 
…it became a national issue, the whole notion of gap-closing …it registered with 
ministers …because we were then able to shine a light on individual school 
performance and individual pupil performance …For the first time, we were able to 
…get schools and ministers to do something about it.    
    (Inderjit Dehal, educational consultant, ex-DfES) 
 
In these reflections education policy is seen as being at least partially self-regulating, with 
data ‘speaking for itself’ (cf. Gillborn et al, 2017). There is less emphasis on the kinds of 
political impetus that drew Brighouse to race equality as an issue. Yet Brighouse’s long 
professional history included work with black communities during his time with ILEA in 
London. In Birmingham during the 1990s race equality bodies such as brap (Birmingham 
Race Action Partnership) lobbied for race equality to become a policy priority and their 
position was strengthened by the publication of Gillborn and Gipps’ (1996) Ofsted report on 
race equality in schools (the publication of which was delayed until the intervention of the 
Commission for Racial Equality). It is also worth noting that ethnic performance data was 
only gathered nationally from 2002 (the year before the launch of the London Challenge), in 
direct response to the Macpherson Report and the RRAA (2000). In unpacking the ‘evidence’ 
discourse, therefore, ethnic performance data might best be described as a tool for policy-
makers to address race equality, rather than as a driver per se.  
 
Equity and performance  
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However, if race equality policy was momentarily buoyed by New Labour’s ‘high 
performance/ high equity’ agenda, contradictions soon became apparent. For, as Ball (2008) 
has pointed out, improving overall performance and closing ethnic gaps are not the same 
thing and do not necessarily occur in tandem. Archer and Francis (2007) argued that by the 
latter half of New Labour’s administration, high performance had taken precedence over 
closing ethnic gaps (see also Tomlinson, 2005). As the influence of Macpherson faded, race 
equality issues tended to be framed in terms of tackling ‘under-achievement’; the direct focus 
on institutional racism urged in Macpherson (1999) and the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 
(2000) was superseded by a ‘colour-blind’ take on educational standards (see Alexander and 
Arday, 2015). 
 
Several participants pointed to a shift in emphasis between performance and equity in 
education policy between Macpherson and the end of the New Labour government in 2010. 
Sir Keith Ajegbo, educational consultant, former head teacher and author of the DfES review, 
Diversity and Citizenship in the Curriculum (Ajegbo et al, 2007), commented on the 
diminishing of race equality criteria in Ofsted’s inspection remit and the consequent slippage 
of race equality work in schools. Ajegbo argued that the Diversity and Citizenship report, 
commissioned under Prime Minister Tony Blair (1997-2010), set an agenda for citizenship 
education in which cultural diversity and social justice were integral. Importantly, the 
citizenship agenda was supported by Ofsted’s infrastructure. As such, said Ajegbo, it was 
deemed to be ‘inside’ school standards criteria, an area in which Ofsted inspectors took 
interest. 
 
However, under Blair’s successor Gordon Brown (2007-2010) the emphasis on plurality in 
the citizenship agenda was displaced by a putative focus on ‘British values’ (see Osler, 2009). 
This represented a significant retreat. There was also a suggestion by at least two 
interviewees (one a former Education minister) that head teachers’ lobbies played a role in 
the marginalisation of race equality issues towards the end of the Labour government. Civil 
servant ‘Celia’ participated in focus groups with influential head teachers: 
 
…head teachers …used to come and advise (DfES). I remember this conversation … 
that race wasn’t such a big issue. Things had ‘changed’. Things were changing 
sufficiently and it wasn’t such a big issue. 
      (‘Celia’, civil servant and academic) 
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The deprioritising of race equality in the latter part of the New Labour administration was 
also referred to in an interview with civil servant Peter Wanless, who reflected on the fate of 
his report on black children and school exclusions. Getting It; Getting It Right (DfES, 2006) 
was enthusiastically received by black parents and campaigners but, in Wanless’ view, 
remained marginal to DfES’ work on achievement and school improvement and therefore did 
not garner the ‘intensive kind of follow-through’ needed to embed policy. Community-driven 
approaches to race and education had become squeezed by the universal focus on literacy and 
numeracy within the school improvement strategy:  
 
…it wasn’t sufficiently connected to a central drive of Government policy and 
priorities …If the report had been on doubling A-grades at maths …politicians would 
have leapt all over (it). 
       (Peter Wanless, ex-DfES) 
 
From New Labour to the Coalition 
If Diversity and Citizenship retained some small purchase within schools and the inspection 
framework in the latter days of New Labour, under the succeeding Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition (2010-2015) the relationship between citizenship and cultural diversity 
was severed – and, very significantly, Ofsted’s focus on race equality was removed.  
 
…from 2007 almost until 2010… (I was) rushing all over the place… talking to 
people about …Citizenship and Diversity and …the ideas that we had about race and 
community. But it was very interesting. Directly it became evident that the Coalition 
weren’t going to have that as part of Ofsted, and that it was no longer so important for 
schools …then those invitations dried up.  
 
…to get an outstanding Ofsted, you had to have a high percentage of A to Cs and 
good SATs results, and (citizenship and race equality work) didn’t particularly 
contribute to that.         
      (Sir Keith Ajegbo, educational 
consultant, former head teacher) 
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Interviewee Ted Cantle, author of the Home Office’s Community Cohesion report, 
commissioned in the wake of 2001’s disturbances in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley, 
attributed Ofsted’s deprioritising of issues around cultural diversity and citizenship to the 
influence of Conservative Education Secretary, Michael Gove: 
 
…the government …took it out of the Ofsted agenda... I think, personally, (Gove) 
didn’t understand …didn’t believe it …and the reason he gave was that he wanted 
schools to concentrate on the key performance targets –  Maths, English, Science – 
and any of this wider education stuff should be ditched... he created a very, very 
narrow agenda’).  
     Ted Cantle (Institute of Community Cohesion) 
         
The RRE study included an interview with ‘Jo’, an Ofsted inspector. ‘Jo’ also attested to shift 
in the status of race within Ofsted’s framework in the period described by Ajegbo. In the 
immediate post-Macpherson period (after 1999-2000) every registered Ofsted inspector was 
required to complete a training course on inclusion that included reading anti-racist research 
(and being tested on it). Under the Coalition race appeared in the Ofsted framework only as a 
footnote reference as a possible area that inspectors might choose to examine. This suggested 
something more than an attitudinal shift; rather, there had been a conscious dismantling of the 
infrastructures that supported race equality policy in education, hastened by the Coalition’s 
remodelling of the standards agenda and by what one interviewee described as ‘generic’, 
‘pseudo-scientific’ models of school improvement (‘...over the last five years the focus has 
completely gone …race …or any type of equality just isn’t a factor.’).  
 
‘Post-racial’ and ‘colour-blind’ 
 
…persistent inequalities still exist … but because black kids, particularly in London, 
are getting higher grades …people think it’s all good and it’s all right …but we know 
that they’re being excluded at high rates …that they’re being diagnosed or 
…statemented with special educational needs at a higher rate. We know that they’re 
less likely to get employment, more likely to get into the criminal justice system. So, 
you can’t take one thing in isolation and say, ‘Yeah… we’ve got it licked.’ 
     (Derek Bardowell, ex-Stephen Lawrence Trust) 
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Perhaps the most pervasive feature of the interviews was the perception among stakeholders 
that, within both mainstream political and educational debate, issues of race and racism were 
considered done and dusted. Race equality issues were marginalised not just because they 
were perceived by policy-makers as outside of or inimical to ‘quality’ and ‘standards’ but 
also because they were regarded as anachronistic, as having been dealt with. Maxie Hayles 
commented:  
 
There’s a fallacy that we live in a post racial era and that’s dangerous. It’s dangerous 
because racism is not ‘if or but’; it’s an inevitable process and we’re not going to get 
utopia. 
       (Maxie Hayles, human rights activist) 
The term ‘post-racial’ is problematic because it has been used to signify very different, some 
would say opposing, claims about the social salience of race and racism. For some 
commentators, the ‘post-racial’ denotes complex social analyses that engage with anti-
essentialism (Leonardo, 2011). However, others, both in academia and politics, have used the 
term to claim boldly – and more simplistically - that racism has declined as a feature of social 
life. Note, for instance, the somewhat haughty terms used in 2012 by then UK Prime Minister 
David Cameron in 2012 to dismiss, as unnecessary effort, the equalities impact tests 
introduced in the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000: ‘We have smart people in 
Whitehall who consider equalities issues while they're making the policy. We don't need all 
this extra tick-box stuff’ (Cameron, cited in BBC, 2012). 
 
One of the most striking remarks made in the project interviews was voiced by Baroness 
Doreen Lawrence. As a result of her family’s lengthy campaign over police mishandling of 
the investigation of her son’s murder, Lawrence has in many ways become an iconic figure, 
elevated to the House of Lords and publicly lauded for her campaigning work around racial 
justice. Yet her comments on the status of race equality policy in the Coalition period were 
unambiguous:  
 
‘…race isn't on the Government agenda, they don’t address race whatsoever.’  
    (Baroness Doreen Lawrence, campaigner and writer) 
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This was a conclusion echoed in a comment on the Coalition government by ‘Howard’, a 
youth worker and former advisor to Boris Johnson during the latter’s term as London Mayor 
(2008-16):  
 
‘They can’t handle the race agenda. They have no language for it. It’s outside of their 
skill set, even their values.’  
    ‘Howard’ (youth worker, former mayoral advisor) 
         
Participants suggested that this ‘fallacious’ but powerful ‘post-racial’ discourse operated by 
portraying concerns about race equality as outmoded, as an anxiety from which society 
needed to ‘move on’. Anti-racism was increasingly associated in public debate with the past, 
with unnecessary discontent and with special pleading. Joy Warmington, CEO of the 
Birmingham’s independent equalities and human rights organisation brap commented: 
 
It’s almost like we felt as a society that we’d done the equality stuff, we’d done the 
race equality stuff… 
   (Joy Warmington, CEO, brap equalities and human rights) 
 
If the race equality ‘stuff’ has been ‘done’, then it can become located a bogus concern. 
Professor Heidi Safia Mirza, an academic and appointee to New Labour’s task force on 
educational standards in 1997, commented on the way in which ‘colour-blind’ discourses 
work to impugn the motives of those arguing for continued action against racial inequality: 
  
…there is this sense in which …race is (seen as) something that only the bitter and 
twisted talk about, only the disillusioned, only those who want a special handout, only 
those who want special favours… I think that’s the common sense kind of way in 
which it works out: that we’re kind of post-equality because we've achieved equality. 
(Professor Heidi Safia Mirza, academic, former advisor on educational standards) 
 
Participants identified phenomena that they felt were commonly used to imply ‘closure’ on 
race issues. These included improvements in attainment in London schools (as noted by 
Derek Bardowell, above); the visibility of an emergent BME middle-class in the UK; even 
the presidency of Barack Obama. Gargi Bhattacharyya identified an inversion mobilised to 
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regulate discussion of racial inequality, whereby - in an ostensibly ‘post-racial’ world - those 
who contest racism are depicted as the source of the problem: 
 
…the discourse of anti-essentialism and the constructedness of race has been so 
effectively taken over by the other side that to name racism becomes racist … If you 
say, ‘this is racism’ that means all you can see is race. ‘I don’t see race. You see race 
because you’re a racist’ … The script has been very effective in terms of silencing 
discussion of racism …and I think (that) has been very eagerly taken up by people in 
authority …because it allows… things to be returned to interpersonal relations and 
racism to not be spoken about and nothing about institutional practice to be spoken 
about.  
    (Professor Gargi Bhattacharyya, trade unionist and academic) 
 
Her argument is comparable with arguments made by, for instance, by Khan (2016) in the 
UK (and Bonilla-Silva and Dietrich, 2011, in the USA) that social construction theses 
originally developed as critical analyses of race have increasingly been employed to justify a 
strategic ‘colour-blindness’. In short, if race is taken as an ‘unreal’ category, then attempts to 
understand social inequalities in terms of race are invalid, misguided or simply inverse 
racism. Anti-racism becomes, at best, a political dinosaur, and at worst, the hobby horse of 
the bitter and twisted.   
 
Macpherson: rise and fall? 
Some participants suggested that the evasion of issues of race and racism was a default 
position, strongly embedded in England’s policy sphere. They suggested pessimistically that 
education and social policy would always seek return to a racialised status quo, maintaining 
racial inequality at manageable levels (‘racism is not if or but; it’s an inevitable process’, 
Maxie Hayles). Other participants, including Gargi Bhattacharyya; veteran activist Professor 
Gus John (Director of the Communities Empowerment Network and former Director of 
Education for Hackney, East London), Rob Berkeley (Director of independent race equality 
think tank, Runnymede Trust, 2009-14) and Sally Tomlinson (academic and former teacher 
and social worker) focused on more historically specific periods of retreat. These included 
perceived failure to build upon specific policy, such as the Macpherson Report and 
subsequent the Race Relations (Amendment) Act (2000).  
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Gillborn (2008) has argued that the public sector duties initiated by the RRAA (2000) 
comprised the most powerful ever manifestation of race equality policy in Britain. Almost all 
of the stakeholder interviewees reflected on the impact of the RRAA (2000), both in terms of 
specific policy and in terms of its wider impact on public debate. One of the reasons that 
Macpherson resonated with many stakeholders was the report’s willingness to name 
institutional racism. However, embrace of the concept within organisations was followed, 
some suggested, by a bureaucratic appropriation that produced more rhetoric than action. 
They recognised the value of Macpherson’s initial definition of institutional racism, insofar 
as it interrogated organisational cultures and structures, as opposed merely to condemning 
individual prejudice. Over time, however, the RRAA (2000)’s bureaucratic approaches to 
examining practices encouraged superficial, performative responses: 
 
…for many organisations and individuals …like ourselves …that had been arguing 
that [racism] is more than just the odd individual here and there, it was really good to 
be able to ‘out’ organisations in a sense - but I think we were very simplistic about the 
mechanism that we were going to use to address such a complex issue and that’s the 
problem, you know, the complexity.  
    (Joy Warmington, CEO, brap equalities and human rights) 
 
Gargi Bhattacharyya also claimed that bureaucratisation had had a deleterious effect upon 
anti-racist action in the workplace, not least in schools, colleges and universities: 
 
…I really feel like there’s a whole generation of activists who after the Macpherson 
Report came out …got buried in paperwork for more than a decade, in order to try 
and pursue what institutional racism meant in our various… organisations …because 
what it created was the opportunity for a highly bureaucratised response to the 
accusation of institutional racism … Of course, we should have known it. We said, 
‘Oh, what we need is …bureaucratic machinery’ and what they said is, ‘You think 
you know about bureaucratic machinery? We’ll show you bureaucratic machinery!’  
   (Professor Gargi Bhattacharyya, trade unionist and academic) 
 
There was a suggestion that the RRRA (2000) got stuck at operational and middle-
management levels, without impinging significantly at the strategic level of, for instance, 
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local authorities or universities. For Rob Berkeley (formerly Runnymede Trust), the effect of 
this bureaucratic turn was that organisations became practiced in making performative 
responses to race equality issues: contrition, but little practical change. Berkeley referred to: 
 
… a farcical …moment of various institutions saying, ‘we’re institutionally racist’… 
it seemed to be fashionable to claim institutional racism. It didn’t seem to be that 
fashionable to do very much about it.  
    (Rob Berkeley, Director of Runnymede Trust, 2009-14) 
 
Gus John, one of the most experienced of the participants, whose research and campaigning 
on race issues stretches back to the late 1960s, spoke in similar terms to Berkeley, noting that 
‘for many being institutionally racist was like a badge of honour …We’ve held our hands up. 
We admit it and we’re working towards goodness.’ Academic Heidi Safia Mirza also offered 
a revisionist take on the ‘iconic’ place of Macpherson and the RRAA (2000):  
 
…it’s meant to be this iconic moment but …it solidified racism in new ways. We had 
the …speech acts, performativity of anti-racism …(Organisations) invoke the term 
‘institutional racism’ …they're seen as ‘doing’ race and that means …they’ve tackled 
the issue …the technologies of concealment become more difficult to reveal because 
the language is there but the very policy mechanisms themselves, have solidified 
racism. So, we’re in this Catch 22. 
(Professor Heidi Safia Mirza, academic, former advisor on educational standards) 
 
Rob Berkeley suggested that by the end of the decade that began with the RRAA (2000), the 
limits of Macpherson’s impact had become apparent: 
 
…there’s an important moment ten years on from the Lawrence enquiry …in 2009, 
just a realisation that despite a lot of talk and a lot of effort from some, actually the 
outcomes hadn’t changed. So, the stickiness of the political system and the institutions 
towards change, I think, is instructive.  
     (Rob Berkeley, Director of Runnymede Trust, 2009-14) 
 
What was being suggested in these accounts of the period after Macpherson?  Is it that 
Macpherson was ineffective because of its inherent flaws, its tendency to bureaucratic 
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inertia? Or is that, in fact, Macpherson and the RRAA (2000) threatened to become all too 
effective in addressing racial inequalities? In going where Swann and Scarman had not, in 
naming institutional racism, did Macpherson become a political liability, subject to backlash 
against ‘multiculturalism’? Certainly, in the view of some participants, Macpherson and the 
RRAA (2000) had opened up spaces to address institutional racism but by 2013 education 
policy had retreated to a pre-Macpherson position: 
 
…go back to Macpherson …at that point you got the recognition of institutionalised 
racism …institutionalised inequality, and so you were able to have those 
conversations and you were able to argue to do things about them. All of that’s 
eroded. You know, again if you raise that issue you’re again thought of as a mad 
person, which you probably were prior to Macpherson.  
    (Inderjit Dehal, educational consultant, ex-DfES) 
 
…that post-Stephen-Lawrence phase was a period of awareness. And I think we’ve 
gone back since then. We might even be in a worse place. Because before Stephen 
Lawrence, black people were visible as the possible recipients of racism. Now they’re 
actually invisible as the possible recipients of racism...  
       (‘Celia’, civil servant and academic)  
 
For interviewees such as Professor Sally Tomlinson, a pioneer in research on race and 
education in Britain, the silence on race equality in education policy was neither accidental 
nor simply due to a lack of managerial skill but a deliberate political retreat. Discussion of 
race, let alone institutional racism, has become too politically costly: 
 
…the immigration debate has made any notion of discussing race, immigration, 
refugees, asylum seekers, whatever, it’s a toxic brew and so I think at the moment 
we’re really caught in that and those of us who have been in it a long time are, I think, 
…quite horrified. 
 (Professor Sally Tomlinson, academic, researcher on race and SEN) 
 
In addition to contemporary ‘toxic’ debates on immigration, asylum and multiculturalism, 
interviewees such as Gargi Bhattacharyya and Patrick Roach (Deputy General Secretary of 
teachers’ union NASUWT) referred to the (re)emergence in education and social policy of a 
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discourse of ‘white working-class’ failure and a parallel discourse of derision around 
multiculturalism (see analyses by, for example, Garner, 2010; Warmington and Grosvenor, 
2011). Increasingly dominant since the early 2000s, this policy discourse holds that white 
working-class children are the fraction most poorly served by schools – and that their position 
has been exacerbated by the supposed priority given to BME pupils’ achievement in the 
1980s and 1990s. For Bhattacharyya, this is a nativist discourse - one in which there is 
discursive and material contest over the entitlement to resources such as education. (‘White 
people are still being badly served because all regular people are being badly served but then 
that becomes available as a kind of counter-rhetoric, in order to say, “Oh look, these… 
darkies taking up all the public space… they’re getting more than us.”’). For Gus John, this 
pattern of retreat from radical action on race is long entrenched in politics and policy: 
 
 …governments throughout the decades have had one eye on what they consider to be 
the responsible and moral thing to do and one eye on making sure that the rest of the 
population didn’t feel that they were being taken out of their comfort zone…  
     (Gus John, Communities Empowerment Network) 
 
John’s conclusion was a restatement of perhaps the most pervasive theme of the stakeholder 
interviews: that the vagaries of race equality policy in education could only be understood in 
relation to the wider politics of race, the wider history of race in Britain. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In the project interviews the ‘stakeholder’ participants depicted the 1990s as a time in which 
race equality concerns became imperfectly embedded in education policy. However, the race 
equality momentum achieved in the immediate aftermath the Macpherson Report (1999) was, 
if not erased, then severely diminished by 2010. The stakeholders suggested that Britain has 
entered not a post-racial field but a field in which education and social policy discourses have 
largely been de-racialized (cf. Warmington, 2014). This rolling back – in education and in the 
broader public space - has left little space for critical understandings of race and racism.  
In terms of future research the key implication of this paper is the need to examine the state 
of contemporary education in the ‘post-multicultural’ context, through a critical race-
conscious lens. In recent years ‘colour-blind’ approaches to research and policy have 
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dominated and crude aggregate ethnic categories have increasingly been employed in annual 
education statistics. The project interviews suggest that the de-racialisation of research and 
policy has led to a slippage in tackling racial inequalities. It is true that the proportion of all 
students achieving at least five higher grade GCSEs almost doubled between 1993 and 2013 
(Gillborn et al, 2017). However, minority ethnic groups have not benefitted equally. In 
particular, black Caribbean and mixed race: white/black Caribbean pupils have experienced 
significant inequalities of achievement. Moreover, Gillborn et al (2017) have found that the 
scale of racial inequalities has been directly and negatively affected by changes in education 
policy and the redefinition of the GCSE benchmark. Each time the government has altered 
the GCSE benchmark (in 2006 and 2011) there has been immediate and negative impact on 
race inequality, affecting each of the major minority ethnic groups, most of all black students. 
Beyond schools, there is a need to investigate racialised gaps in attainment and access to high 
status programmes in further/ vocational education and higher education. 
 
What the voices in the current paper offer in critical terms are not dinosaur relics but a 
powerful counter-narrative to the kind of education policy rhetoric that, according to Archer 
and Francis (2007: 1), ‘denies racism as a potential cause of differences in achievement and 
hides inequalities within congratulatory public statements.’ The narratives explored here are 
sometimes pessimistic but that very pessimism may generate critical questions about the 
standing of race in education policy. For race does not simply disappear from policy 
discourse. Ostensibly colour-blind policy may still rest upon deeply racialized notions, even 
if it does not name race and racism. 
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